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Abstract 
 
Despairing over the Present Age by Brodie Gilchrist – Advisor Robert Faulkner 
 
19th Century Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard believed society alienates individuals 
from their true selves. Kierkegaard entitles this concept “despair.” As such, despair deals 
not only with Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the individual but also of the evolution of 
societies. While arguing that despair has existed throughout human history, this paper is 
an exploration of the ways in which modern or “Present Age” societies uniquely 
exacerbate despair according to Kierkegaard. This work begins with an in-depth look at 
Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the individual and of the self and then addresses the 
difference between modern and pre-modern societies. Analysis of Kierkegaard’s works 
concludes with a discussion of modern social institutions and their contributions to the 
problems of the present age.
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
19th Century Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard has been revered for his 
penetrating theological works. In addition to his theological treatises, Kierkegaard also 
wrote a series of predictions and warnings regarding the development of the present age 
and the social evolution of the individual. Specifically, he believes modern societies 
cause an alienation of the individual from his divinely intended nature. Kierkegaard 
places this individual in a state that he entitles “despair.” Despair represents the suffering 
of the individual in returning to their true self. His writing about the “present age” reveals 
a thoughtful study of the contrast between an emerging sense of modernity and the pre-
modern world. This paper will examine both Kierkegaard’s concept of despair and his 
treatment of the present age in an attempt to address the question, how do modern 
societies uniquely exacerbate despair within individuals? 
My study focuses on Kierkegaard’s Two Ages and The Sickness Unto Death as the 
two most relevant works. The Sickness Unto Death is Kierkegaard’s attempt to 
understand the “spiritual sickness” that applies to the individual in despair. Kierkegaard 
finds the modern individual to be an intersection of forces moving him in different 
directions. Freedom, necessity, and the eternal soul of the individual all influence his 
actions and decisions to varying degrees. As a result, there is no single interpretation of 
despair. Instead, it may take several forms and exhibit differing symptoms based upon the 
degree to which these forces interact within each individual. His analysis brings forward 
other fundamental concepts, such as the relationship between the individual and freedom, 
the basis for materialism, and the foundation for modern religious anxieties. The second 
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chapter of this work will be devoted to exploring Kierkegaard’s conception of the 
individual, the foundation for despair, and the foundations on which the present age was 
constructed. 
After engaging Kierkegaard’s conception of the individual, I will turn, in chapters 
3 & 4 to his work Two Ages. Two Ages attempts to understand the basis for the behavior 
of societies. Kierkegaard’s Two Ages is framed around a literary review of Danish author 
Thomasine Gyllembourg’s work of the same name. The first two parts of Kierkegaard’s 
work analyze Gyllembourg’s literary constructions such as setting and characters. The 
third and final section allows Kierkegaard to meditate on the main themes of 
Gyllembourg’s work, particularly with regards to two specific ages and their respective 
institutions, organization, and dominant modes of thought. The two ages to which the title 
alludes, the Present Age and the Revolutionary Age, stand in stark contrast to each other 
and provide the reader with an excellent account of the development of modern societies. 
In his historical introduction, translator and renowned Kierkegaard scholar Howard Hong 
notes the surprise of present day readers regarding the pertinence of the thinker’s claims. 
Hong states, “To many present-day readers the insights into the elemental trends in 
private and public life seem very penetrating and contemporary, a kind of prophecy from 
a solitary thinker of another century” (Two Ages, Introduction, xi1.) This “solitary 
thinker” provides insight into many aspects of society including governance, economics, 
the press, the separation between public and private spheres, and the state of modern 
religion. My analysis of Kierkegaard’s Two Ages will occur in chapters three and four. 
                                                 
1
 The format for citations which will be used throughout this examination for Kierkegaard will be as 
follows: (Book Title; Part, Section, Original Page Number) 
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The third chapter will focus on the delineations between the ages while the fourth will 
isolate three fundamental institutions of the present age in the press, the public, and the 
state. 
 
The Life and Times of Søren Aabye 
My study of the works of Kierkegaard begins with a brief exploration of his life to 
provide a context for his writings. Søren Kierkegaard was born the youngest child of 
seven to a religiously conservative family on May 5th, 1813. The society he was born into 
was far from perfect. Kierkegaard biographer Joakim Garff notes, “Exactly four months 
before Søren Aabye’s birth, the government [of Denmark] decided that the so-called 
currency notes, which could be redeemed for hard silver, would be replaced by notes 
issued by the national bank, worth only one-sixth of the face value of the original notes. 
State bankruptcy had arrived.” (Garff 8.) As a result of excellent financial planning and a 
bit of luck, the Kierkegaard family avoided economic hardship and remained one of the 
richest families in Denmark. Politically, Denmark was, and remains today, a form of 
monarchy2. Two Ages indicates a decline in the legitimacy and power of this regime at 
the hands of public opinion. Religion, more precisely the Lutheran Church, was a state 
sponsored institution. The link between church and state became the focus of much of 
Kierkegaard’s later years of writing. Sections of The Sickness Unto Death foreshadow 
this by displaying modern religion as a form of “parrot morality” where the repetition of 
divine creeds is the only form of religious observance. While not being the subject of this 
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 The Danish monarchy became a constitutional monarchy in the mid 19th century after Kierkegaard’s 
publication of Two Ages. 
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particular examination, his criticisms of the interaction between church and state are 
similarly alluded to within the pages of Two Ages. Denmark still maintains this intimate 
link between state and religion. 
 Søren grew up a spoiled, mischievous, and sarcastic child despite frequently 
declaring (as would be seen in many of his letters and correspondence to other siblings 
and/or friends) his frequent mistreatment at the hands of his father. Prior to the age of ten, 
Kierkegaard witnessed the death of two of his siblings. This trauma to the family caused 
the father to take his “Jutland simplicity” to the extreme and outlaw toys in the 
Kierkegaard home, as they represented something too earthly and supposedly distracted 
the children from more important things. The headmaster of the school Søren attended 
said of the family, “Because the father’s home is thus such a model of industriousness, 
patience, and moderation, and is arranged in conformity with the principles by which 
children are trained in civic virtue and in God-given wisdom, he has enjoined his son 
[Søren] to view all things in light of the fear of God and a sense of duty, and to seek the 
source of all things in God as the fount of all wisdom” (Garff 27.) While differing 
accounts exist of the character of Søren as a child, the household in which he was raised 
was well documented and had a significant influence on his thought process and lifestyle. 
 His father Michael, a former merchant, was greatly involved in the lives of his 
children. He ran a very regimented and disciplined household, urging his children to 
reach their full potential in all their endeavors. Behind this ordered facade was a very 
troubled man who experienced nothing short of “torture” by his intimate knowledge and 
study of Christianity. Søren states, “The anxiety with which my father filled my soul, his 
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own frightful melancholia, the many things of this sort that I cannot even write down. I 
felt such an anxiety about Christianity, and yet I felt myself so powerfully drawn toward 
it” (Garff 15.) Garff notes that accounts of Michael Kierkegaard’s actual personality are 
scarce outside of recovered correspondence and Søren’s comments in his writing. As 
such, the accuracy of Søren’s account of him is not known to a full extent. Ultimately, 
few individuals were as significant to Kierkegaard’s life as his father. One such 
individual was Regine Olsen. 
 Kierkegaard, despite being an individual who was frequently coping with anxiety 
and despair, was not immune to falling in love. Around the same time that Kierkegaard’s 
father passed away, he became infatuated with a young lady by the name of Regine 
Olsen. Garff’s account finds Regine to be beautiful, compassionate, and brilliant. 
However, her youthfulness imparted a certain passion and lust that would be the cause of 
much tension and anxiety within their relationship, “…during the early part of their 
engagement he tried to cool down her amorous passions by reading her a sermon from 
Mynster [the Kierkegaard family’s preferred confessor] every week” (Garff 183.) 
Nevertheless, this did not prevent Søren from asking for her hand in marriage. Their 
engagement, however, proved to be tumultuous. At the time, Søren was preparing to 
begin his study at a pastoral seminary while completing his degree requirements. The 
course of their relationship and its effects on Kierkegaard’s writings are summed up by 
Garff, “Rather, it became a grand drama about the extremes in the intellectual history of 
the West: immediacy and reflection, sensuous desire and self-control, presence and 
absence. And even though Regine is not named one single time in the whole of 
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Kierkegaard’s published works, she is intertwined with it like an erotic arabesque, full of 
longing, sometimes confronting the reader when one least expects it” (Garff 190.) Their 
troubled relationship would eventually end not, as commonly believed, as a result of 
Søren’s overbearing anxiety, but rather as a result of a loss of interest on his part.  
Ideologically, Søren’s development began as a combination of his father’s 
simplistic yet intellectual lifestyle coupled with his own personal educational 
experiences. Kierkegaard’s encounter and subsequent involvement with the forces of 
modernity, for example, began shortly after beginning theological study. While still 
lacking in academic interest as a student, Søren became deeply involved in the workings 
of Christianity. He subsequently became very conscious of internal dogmatic tensions 
and inconsistencies that caused him to question the very fabric of Christianity. Such 
knowledge coupled with a keen sense of logic also drove Kierkegaard towards what 
Garff refers to as “godly awakening movements.” He states, “Composed of roughly equal 
portions of reaction (back to true Lutheranism) and revolution (down with the power of 
the clergy as a ruling class in society), the godly awakenings were a threat to the State 
Church… Viewed politically, the godly awakenings were thus not unimportant in the 
development of modern democracy” (Garff 32.) These experiences, coupled with his 
involvement with the Danish press, brought Kierkegaard in contact with forces of 
modernity that had yet to be experienced by any previous generation. Kierkegaard 
considered these forces alongside the nature of man, and found a dangerous form of 
alienation in “despair.”  
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 Many thinkers’ accounts of modernity include statements regarding the 
development of the natural sciences. However, such statements are absent from 
Kierkegaard’s analysis. The sciences were not something curiously passed-over in 
Søren’s life. Rather, he took the study of the natural sciences very seriously. At one point, 
he considered devoting his life to a study of the natural world. Garff documented one 
such passage in Kierkegaard’s journals stating, “’I have been inspired by the natural 
sciences and I still am, yet it seems to me that I will not make them my principal field of 
study. By virtue of reason and freedom, it is life that has always interested me most, and 
it has always been my wish to clarify and solve the riddle of life’” (Garff 52.) The “riddle 
of life” he alludes to can be seen pointing directly to his study of the individual in despair 
and his search for identity. Søren frequently struggled with the abstract concept of 
identity as well as his own identity throughout his life. One of his meditations concerning 
this riddle of life provides a concise explanation of his search. He states, “’What I really 
need is to be clear about what I am to do, not about what I must know, except insofar as 
knowledge must precede every action. It is a question of understanding my destiny, of 
seeing what the Deity really wants me to do. It is a question of find a truth that is truth for 
me, of finding the idea for which I am willing to live and die’” (Garff 58.) For 
Kierkegaard, what one does and how one acts is largely indicative of whom one is.  He 
would later identify this idea as the “true self.” This search would become the idea that 
would define his life and greatly influence his writings as will be seen most in the next 
chapter, which examines The Sickness Unto Death. 
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Chapter 2: The Individual in Despair 
 
Despair is a complicated subject for several reasons. Not only is Kierkegaard’s 
interpretation of the individual extremely confusing for first-time readers, but they will 
also struggle to grasp the context and intent of The Sickness Unto Death. In consideration 
of the former, despite his seemingly poetic statements and the elegance with which he 
writes, many of his key themes are obscured by his rhetoric. Support for this can be found 
in the first few remarks of the first section, where readers are greeted by the following 
seemingly incoherent passage, “A human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the 
self. But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the 
relation’s relating itself to itself in the relation” (Sickness; Part I, Section A, XI-127.) 
Only through further study does the reader come to gain knowledge of the two opposing 
dynamics of self, and how the overarching category of “self” is the relation of which he 
speaks. The object of this exploration of Kierkegaard’s despair will be to bring to light 
these aspects of the self and how they could explain both the origins of and the driving 
force behind the present age. 
 The most effective way to study despair is through posing a series of questions 
and turning to Kierkegaard’s work The Sickness Unto Death for answers. The answers to 
these questions will mostly emerge from Part One. Part Two is not expressly relevant to 
this work as it attempts to expose many of the contradictions and problematic areas of 
Christian dogma. The first question will necessarily address the linkages between the 
present age and despair and build a context for the definition and understanding of 
despair. 
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Why is despair a significant topic for study? 
The universality of despair quickly becomes apparent as Kierkegaard’s 
motivation for writing such a treatise. In the first few pages he states, “In any case, no 
human being ever lived and no one lives outside of Christendom who has not despaired, 
and no one in Christendom if he is not a true Christian, and insofar as he is not wholly 
that, he is still to some extent in despair” (Sickness; Part I, Section B, XI-136.) Much like 
the title of this section in Sickness Unto Death, despair is an absolutely universal concept. 
It is important to understand that despairing is not a concept unique to the present age. 
Rather, the new arrangement of society within the present age uniquely exacerbates 
despair and its problems within individuals. Additionally, Kierkegaard brings Christianity 
to the forefront through an assertion that despairing is both a positive and negative force 
within the Christian. It is a positive force insofar as Christianity affects the way the 
individual perceives and is ultimately able to cope with or seek alleviation from despair. 
Its negativity is manifest in the intense suffering and sorrow experienced by anyone 
attempting to seek the true self. 
How does the present age exacerbate despair? Such a question would be difficult 
to answer without first knowing Kierkegaard’s concept of despair and his criticisms of 
the present age. Despair is an issue of identity. The individual is an intersection of many 
different internal and external forces. While these forces act on the individual, the 
individual largely has the freedom to alter the degree to which these forces influence him. 
Through this act, the individual defines himself through the creation of an artificial 
identity and provisional self. Despair is precisely the difference between the individual’s 
10 
provisional self and his true self3 and the problems that result from such a discrepancy. 
The present age has been arranged by these despairing individuals and caters to a very 
superficial alleviation of despair through treatment of the symptoms, rather than the 
“spiritual illness” (Sickness; Part One, Section B, XI-136) itself. This results in the further 
masking of despair in a veil of ignorance. This ignorance is a serious obstacle to 
identification and treatment of despair.  
Studying despair also allows individuals to gain consciousness of their weakness 
and fragility. Kierkegaard follows the Christian belief that God creates each and every 
human being. Once humans are released into the world of freedom and possibility, they 
become fragile and weak. Weakness implies a lacking in ability to know or control 
oneself properly while fragility speaks to the inability of the individual to resist the allure 
of externalities. Evidence of both the fragility and weakness of the individual comes forth 
during a statement made in the concluding remarks of Two Ages, where Kierkegaard 
argues, “It will no longer be as it once was, that individuals could look to the nearest 
eminence for orientation when things got hazy before their eyes” (Two Ages; Part III, 
VIII-100.) Individuals turn towards institutions, organizations, and other individuals 
when “things get hazy.” One of the key themes behind Two Ages is a flaw of humanity in 
which individuals are wholly incapable of moving forward from a state of reflection to 
solve problems on their own, let alone gaining knowledge of their true identity. I will 
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 Kierkegaard asserts that the individual wishes to be someone else. In any case where that is true, I will use 
the term “provisional” to apply to any constructed self (or rather any self that is not the true self.) God, in 
contrast, eternally grants the true self to each individual. 
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now look to Kierkegaard’s work for a definition of despair followed by its symptoms and 
progression. 
 
What is the concept of despair, what does it mean for an individual to be “in 
despair?” 
 What is despair? Initial statements of Sickness Unto Death stress the importance 
of the “relation” that is the “self” and what the individual should know about the self. The 
self is the all-encompassing term used to describe the divinely created individual. The 
true self, in contrast to the provisional self, is unchanging. Within this actual self, there 
are two different yet inexorably joined kinds of self: the physical elements (body and 
mind4) and spirit (Sickness; Part I, Section A, XI-127.) Both aspects of the self have 
certain independent and opposing characteristics. For example, the physical self 
represents finitude embodied in the earthly aspects of the individual. On the other hand, 
the spirit represents the infinite nature of the individual, or that link between God and 
man. Contained within the term “infinite” is the Christian belief in the eternal nature of 
our soul. The dichotomy between the infinite and the finite is essential to understanding 
the true nature of the self.  
A further dichotomy between possibility and necessity allows for an 
understanding of the individual in relation to his world. Possibility is simply the capacity 
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 These concepts are separated in Kierkegaard’s analysis, yet are treated as one and the same thing: the 
earthly living portion of the self. In this sense, the mind is distinct from spirit insofar as spirit is the aspect 
of the self responsible for reflection, valuation, decision, and action. Much like the dichotomies seen below, 
the mind and body are somewhat “inanimate” aspects of the self that offset spirit, which is motion. In the 
following chapter, we will see how the present age, a society built around a masking of spirit, becomes 
passionless and loses the will to action, thus stagnating and foreclosing the possibility of even knowing 
despair. 
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of the individual “to be able to.” Necessity represents an inherent need in the individual 
“to become.” Of these two categories Kierkegaard states, “Possibility and necessity are 
equally essential to becoming (and the self has the task of becoming itself in freedom). 
Possibility and necessity belong to the self just as do infinitude and finitude. A self that 
has no possibility is in despair, and likewise a self that has no necessity… The self is 
potentially just as possible as it is necessary, for it is indeed itself, but it has the task of 
becoming itself. Insofar as it is itself, it is the necessary, and insofar as it has the task of 
becoming itself, it is a possibility” (Sickness; Part 1, Section C, XI-148.) Necessity 
represents the force that moves an individual towards his divinely granted self. Possibility 
allows for the individual to move from their provisional self to this true self. Kierkegaard 
explains that all these factors (possibility, necessity, finitude, and infinity) are organized 
into two main categories: limiting and delimiting. The limiting factors, such as finitude 
and necessity, are those concepts that place a strain on the freedom of the individual. It 
follows that the infinite and possibility represent and embody the freedom of the 
individual.  
Freedom is a central theme in both The Sickness Unto Death and Two Ages. As 
seen above, the self has the task of becoming itself in freedom. What should be 
understood as Kierkegaard’s interpretation of freedom? He states, “Where, then, does the 
despair come from? From the relation in which the synthesis relates itself to itself, 
inasmuch as God, who constituted man as a relation, releases it from his hand, as it were 
– that is, inasmuch as the relation relates itself to itself” (Sickness; Part I, Section A, XI-
130.) From the point where the individual separates from his creator, the self has the 
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possibility of despairing. This occurs when an individual accumulates knowledge and 
beliefs from his surroundings, which results in the creation of the provisional self that is 
fundamentally different than the actual true self. For this reason, the individual is 
responsible for knowing and becoming the self in a world of freedom and possibilities, a 
task that is much easier to accomplish in theory than in practice.  
The way in which the totalizing category of “self” is related to these concepts 
insofar as their interrelation is concerned. When there is a known balance or harmony 
between these opposing concepts, the self may be seen and understood. However, when a 
“misrelation” (Sickness; Part I, Section A, XI-130) exists within the opposing aspects of 
the self (or relating itself to itself, to use Kierkegaard’s language), despair occurs. The 
term despair refers to a condition that results from an improper balance of the self. 
Ignorance of the self and of despair poses an even greater threat to the individual, as he 
cannot address issues of which he has no knowledge. This issue of ignorance brings 
urgency to a matter that spans the entire life of the individual. The individual must gain 
knowledge of the self in order to begin moving along the progression of despair towards 
its alleviation. Kierkegaard states, “Consequently, to be able to despair is an infinite 
advantage, and yet to be in despair is not only the worst misfortune and misery – no, it is 
ruination” (Sickness; Part I, Section C, XI-129.) Though one who is in despair 
experiences a form of spiritual torture, those who never know of despair do not have the 
possibility of progressing toward the liberation of the self. To the ignorant one, the true 
self despairs over its inability to emerge from beneath the provisional self. The question 
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that must be addressed next is: what happens to those individuals who are unable to find a 
way to alleviate their despair? 
In one of the most moving passages in The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard 
reveals the severity of despair: 
And when the hourglass has run out, the hourglass of 
temporality, when the noise of secular life has grown silent 
and its restless or ineffectual activism has come to an end, 
when everything around you is still, as it is in eternity, then 
– whether you were a man or woman, rich or poor, 
dependent or independent, fortunate or unfortunate, 
whether you ranked with royalty and wore a glittering 
crown or in humble obscurity you bore the toil and heat of 
the day, whether your name will be remembered as long as 
the world stands and consequently as long as it stood or 
you are nameless and run nameless in the innumerable 
multitude, whether you surpassed all human description or 
the most severe and ignominious human judgment befell 
you – eternity asks you and every individual in these 
millions and millions about only one thing: whether you 
have lived in despair or not, whether you have despaired in 
such a way that you did not realize you were in despair, or 
in such a way that you covertly carried this sickness inside 
of you as your gnawing secret, as a fruit of sinful love 
under your heart, or in such a way that you, a terror to 
others raged in despair. And if so, if you have lived in 
despair, then, regardless of whatever else you won or lost, 
everything is lost for you, eternity does not acknowledge 
you, it never knew you – or, still more terrible, it knows 
you as you are known and binds you to yourself in despair5. 
The first thing of note in this account is the contrast with the various aspects of the 
“secular” world. One of the main themes running throughout the body of this work is the 
importance of the true self over the material goods, worldly honors, and other 
“distractions” embraced by the provisional self. These earthly desires belong to the first 
few stages of despair, or immediacy. Secondly, this quote provides the impact to a life 
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 Sickness; Part I, Section B, XI-141 
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lived in despair: to be bound to the despairing self and cast aside by eternity. Kierkegaard 
calls this concept the “inability to die.” 
 
The Christian Conception of Despair 
The “inability to die” distinguishes despair from other fatal illnesses. While 
certain ailments and diseases can kill the physical self, sicknesses of the soul cannot. This 
is due to the soul’s eternal nature. Rather, Kierkegaard is considering the Christian 
conception of death, which extends the idea of despair past physical death and into the 
eternal life of the soul (Sickness; Part I, Section A, XI-131.) Kierkegaard believes that 
physical death causes an awakening in the eternal soul. If the individual dies while 
despairing, the awakened aspects of the self remain in a state of sorrow and confusion6 
forever. The individual bound to himself has made the choice to accept his provisional 
self rather than suffering through the “ruination” of despair in order to know his actual 
self.  
Christianity also affects the way individuals perceive despair. Kierkegaard 
believes that Christians, through teachings and scripture, have already been informed of 
their true self and are told of the dangers of holding their earthly provisional self. He 
states, “The possibility of this sickness is man’s superiority over the animal; to be aware 
of this sickness is the Christian’s superiority over the natural man; to be cured of this 
sickness is the Christian’s blessedness.” (Sickness; Part I, Section A, XI-129.) This takes 
his analysis one step further than purely ignorance and attributes despair’s “cure” to 
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 For this reason, the term “despair” also refers to the sorrow felt by the true self concealed beneath layers 
of the provisional self. 
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Christianity as well. It follows that only one who is able to understand the purpose of life 
may make the conscious decision to walk that path. 
What is the relationship between despair and sin? From Kierkegaard’s 
perspective, despair is sin. He goes on to explain, “Sin is: before God, or with the 
conception of God, in despair not to will to be oneself, or in despair to will to be oneself. 
Thus sin is intensified weakness or intensified defiance: sin is the intensification of 
despair” (Sickness; Part II, Section A, XI-189.) Despairing not to will to be oneself and 
willing to be oneself are two overarching categories that are used to organize stages in the 
progression of despair. To not will to be oneself would be the creation and subsequent 
acceptance of the provisional self and is embodied in the early stages of despair. The 
further one becomes involved in the search for the true self, the more he will to be this 
self. In both cases, the individual sins either through declaring that the true self, God’s 
creation and gift to mankind, is unimportant or by creating a “fantasized” self through 
knowledge of the infinite possibilities of God. These stages of despair will now be 
considered. 
 
Symptoms, Forms, and Progression of Despair 
Despair affects the individual in a number of ways. As for “symptoms” of despair, 
the context is necessarily complicated due to the provisional self’s masking of the true 
self. Kierkegaard draws an analogy to the medical profession and the relationship 
between the physician and the sick. In this relationship, the physician has the power to 
assess, diagnose, and prescribe treatments according to his own expertise. In other words, 
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the sick individual is unqualified to diagnose himself due to the proximity with the 
illness, and should rely on the physician for information (Sickness; Part I, Section B, XI-
137.) Despair is exactly the opposite situation. Each individual must, in freedom and 
absent any external controls, understand his personal despair and seek the true self. 
Forms or symptoms of despair differ upon the basis of this “misrelation” within the 
individual and will be examined accordingly. 
I will begin by isolating Kierkegaard’s delimiting aspects of the self, with analysis 
of the limiting aspects to follow. First, one form of despair is experienced through an 
excess of infinitude in their provisional self. The individual becomes lost in the infinite 
possibility of God, intoxicating himself with “fantasies” of what he might become 
(Sickness; Part I, Section C, XI-144.) It is further stated that this causes the self to 
become detached and abstracted, mimicking the infinite possibilities it perceives. The 
second delimiting aspect of the self is possibility. Similar to that of infinitude, an excess 
of possibility is met with paralysis on behalf of the individual. Possibility differs from 
infinitude insofar as paralysis occurs through an excess of earthly possibility as well as 
divine possibility. Kierkegaard states, “This self [one despairing in possibility] becomes 
an abstract possibility; it flounders in possibility until exhausted but neither moves from 
the place where it is nor arrives anywhere, for necessity is literally that place; to become 
oneself is a movement away from that place, but to become oneself is a movement in that 
place.” (Sickness; Part I, Section C, XI-148)  
What factors oppose and constrain these delimiting factors? Finite aspects of man 
are those earthly components of the individual ranging from sense perception to worldly 
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desires and material possessions. An excess of finitude causes the individual to be unable 
to see past the provisional self to the possibility of the true divine self. Kierkegaard sums 
this point, “In fact, what is called the secular mentality consists simply of such men who, 
so to speak, mortgage themselves to the world. They use their capacities, amass money, 
carry on secular enterprises, calculate shrewdly, etc., perhaps make a name in history, but 
themselves they are not; spiritually speaking, they have no self, no self for whose sake 
they could venture everything, no self before God – however self-seeking they are 
otherwise” (Sickness; Part I, Section C, XI-148.) This form of despair surrounded in 
triviality is also called the “Philistine-Bourgeois” mentality. On the other hand, an excess 
of necessity would result in confusion. The individual has the will “to become” without 
something to become. This results in the individual becoming deeply involved in his 
provisional self through a lacking of possibilities. This individual cannot see any 
alternatives and grows in place rather than venturing to become his true self. 
The difference between delimiting and limiting factors indicates the problematic 
nature of the freedom of the individual. When considering delimiting aspects of the self, 
it is especially true where the individual becomes stagnant in reflection over possibilities, 
causing him to lose any impetus to act. This becomes extremely problematic for modern 
societies that are built upon freedom of lifestyle, profession, and belief. Much of Two 
Ages is devoted to tracing the path of this problem from the individual up to the level of 
society on the whole. The limiting aspects of the self cause similar paralysis in the 
development of individuals. In other words, any factors which result in the individual 
despairing in excess forecloses the possibility of developing a more full understanding of 
19 
the self. These aspects of the self and types of despair will be found along the path which 
one follows in the logical progression through despair, and ultimately leads one to the 
crises where one must acknowledge the true self or be bound to their eternally despairing 
self. We now turn to the progression of despair. This begins with an examination of the 
forms of despair where the individual does not will to be oneself, or in other words, 
“despairs in weakness” (Sickness; Part 1, Section C, XI-161.) 
 The most common stages in the progression of despair are identified using the 
term immediacy. Two stages deal expressly with immediacy, the third is associated with 
the term reserve, while the final forms of despair are characterized as demonic, reflecting 
the intensity with which they are experienced. The first stage in the progression of the 
despairing individual is pure immediacy. Immediacy, in this sense, is akin to the 
individual who despairs through an excess of finitude. The man of immediacy is one who 
knows nothing beyond his secular and provisional life and has no conception of the true 
self whatsoever. More importantly, this man lacks reflection, which is a function of spirit 
(Sickness; Part I, Section C, XI-163.) Kierkegaard embraces two definitions of the 
concept of reflection that essentially refer to a process of “thinking.” Divine reflection 
held by the individual’s spirit may reveal a small aspect of the true self.  
The man of immediacy gauges satisfaction of his life through superficial 
“happiness” attained through satiating earthly desires. If the individual becomes unhappy, 
he may self diagnose this as a state of despair. Unhappiness may occur for any number of 
reasons, such as the inability to satisfy one of these earthly desires. Instead of attempting 
to augment his state to seek greater happiness, the individual does not will to be oneself. 
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In this case, the individual wishes to discard his provisional self and construct another in 
its place. The will to discard the self, in this instance, is described by Kierkegaard: 
The man of immediacy does not know himself, he quite 
literally identifies himself only by the clothes he wears, he 
identifies having a self by externalities (here again the 
infinitely comical). There is hardly a more ludicrous 
mistake, for a self is indeed infinitely distinct from an 
externality. So when the externals have completely changed 
for the person of immediacy and he has despaired, he goes 
one step further; he thinks something like this, it becomes 
his wish: What if I became someone else, got myself a new 
self. Well, what if he did become someone else? I wonder 
whether he would recognize himself. There is a story about 
a peasant who went barefooted to town with enough money 
to buy himself a pair of stockings and shoes and to get 
drunk, and in trying to find his way home in his drunken 
state, he fell asleep in the middle of the road. A carriage 
came along, and the drive shouted to him to move or he 
would drive over his legs. The drunken peasant woke up, 
looked at his legs and, not recognizing them because of the 
shoes and stockings, said: ‘go ahead, they are not my 
legs7.’ 
For the man in the story, he was unable to recognize his new provisional self and suffered 
accordingly. If this man never passes beyond this first stage of despairing in immediacy, 
he will cripple and render the eternal aspects of the self powerless under the weight of the 
provisional self. 
 The next stage occurs out of nothing more than an instance of good fortune. If the 
individual, by some stroke of luck, engages the latent reflection of the self, a 
breakthrough occurs. Kierkegaard describes these resulting changes, “With this certain 
degree of reflection begins the act of separation whereby the self becomes aware of itself 
as essentially different from the environment and external events and from their influence 
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upon it” (Sickness; Part I, Section C, XI-167.) This is a very significant step in the right 
direction from Kierkegaard’s point of view. However, throughout Kierkegaard’s accounts 
of despair, few things have a more devastating effect on the possibility of progress 
towards the alleviation of despair than the trivialities of secular society. The individual 
may choose to abandon this path and return exclusively to the trivialities, honors, and 
distractions of secular life. Kierkegaard considers this regression in progress towards the 
true self as the worst form of “wretchedness.” From the eyes of humanity, this dilemma 
appears as follows: 
There are very few persons who live even approximately 
within the qualification of spirit; indeed, there are not many 
who even try this life, and most of those who do soon back 
out of it. They have not learned to fear, have not learned ‘to 
have to’ without any dependence, none at all, upon 
whatever else happens. Therefore, they are unable to bear 
what already appears to them to be a contradiction, what in 
reflection in the surroundings looks all the more glaring, so 
that to be concerned about one’s soul and to will to be spirit 
seems to be a waste of time in the world, indeed, an 
indefensible waste of time that ought to be punished by 
civil law if possible, one that is treason against the human 
race, as a defiant madness that insanely fills out time with 
nothing. Then comes a moment in their lives – alas, this is 
their best time – when they begin to turn inward. Then, 
when they encounter their first difficulties, they turn away; 
it seems to them that this path leads to a dismal desert while 
all about lie meadows fresh and green. And so they take off 
and soon forget that time, the best time of their lives – alas, 
forget it as if it were a piece of childishness8. 
In this way, there is an ideological link between the concept of despair, or, more 
appropriately, the human response to despair, and the construction of the present age. 
Each individual, if they are able to perceive aspects of the self that appear in “glaring” 
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contrast to the surrounding secular world, must make the choice between an investigation 
of the self or a return to secular society. However, present age society has removed the 
incentive to attempt any “difficult” endeavor, causing individuals to return to secular 
society at the first hint of such difficulty. 
 As if the snares of the secular world were not substantial enough, another 
misconception could be responsible for relapses back to pure immediacy. In the section 
quoted above, the individual writes off his despair as being perhaps “a piece of 
childishness.” As this individual returns to his provisional life, he observes others and the 
decisions they make, offering a simple message of futility to those wishing to make a 
similar decision. Such an individual writes despair off as nothing more than misguided 
“youthfulness.” Kierkegaard notes, “As stated, this despair is the most common, so 
common that this alone explains the common notion that despair is part of being young, 
something that appears only in the early years but is not found in the mature person who 
has reached the age of discretion. This is a desperate error… No, despair certainly is not 
something that appears only in the young, something one outgrows as a matter of 
course…” (Sickness; Section I, Part C, XI-170.) The individual wishing to continue his 
journey through the progression of despair must not be disheartened or led astray by 
those entitling this as youthfulness. Instead he must persevere through consciousness and 
strength of reflection towards the truth.  
 If this individual manages to pursue his journey despite obstacles blocking the 
path through despair, he arrives at the next major stage of despair entitled inclosing 
reserve. It is important to note that inclosing reserve and immediacy function completely 
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differently. Such an individual is conscious of his previous turn towards secular life and 
the weakness that accompanied that decision. He is embittered toward himself and wills 
not to be himself more intensely than ever before. The despair of the reservist9 is 
qualitatively different than that experienced by the man of immediacy. Kierkegaard refers 
to this transition as the transition from “despairing in weakness to despairing over one’s 
weakness” (Sickness; Part I, Section C, XI-172.)  
 The reservist, in contrast to the man of immediacy, largely keeps to himself. 
Kierkegaard portrays him as an individual who has enclosed himself, his search, and his 
sorrowful act of despairing within himself (hence the name “inclosing reserve.”) This 
spiritual and mental enclosure causes the individual to long for solitude. It is stated, 
“When it is done, when his longing for solitude is satisfied, he goes out, as it were – even 
when he goes in to or is involved with his wife and children. Aside from his natural good 
nature and sense of duty, what makes him such a kind husband and solicitous father is the 
confession about this weakness that he has made to himself in his inclosed [sic] 
innermost being” (Sickness; Part I, Section C, XI-176.) He is portrayed as a functioning 
member of society despite this occasional desire towards solitude. Once this is fulfilled, 
the individual returns to his life as if nothing occurred. 
 This turn inward is not indicative of the alleviation of despair although it marks 
significant progress. This progress is not without its dangers. Kierkegaard finds this 
capacity of the reservist to be fatal if taken to extremes. He states, “If this inclosing 
reserve is maintained completely, omnibus numeris absoluta, then his greatest danger is 
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suicide… But if he opens up to one single person, he probably will become so relaxed, or 
so let down, that suicide will not result from inclosing reserve” (Sickness; Part I, Section 
C, XI-178.) This confidant assists not only with a relief in pressure, but also as a medium 
through which the individual can sort out his beliefs towards a more effective pursuit of 
the truth. The rearranged individual reaches another qualitatively different stage in 
despairing revolving around a will to be the self, rather than a flawed provisional façade. 
 From here, the individual has transcended his previous weakness and now wills to 
be oneself or, more properly, the true self. This type of despair, contrary to willing not to 
be oneself, is characterized in a way similar to despairing due to an excess of delimiting 
functions of the self. When the individual wills to be oneself, the provisional self is 
eliminated and the until-now hidden infinite spirit becomes visible. The shock of this 
revelation may intoxicate the individual with the pure possibility causing him to engage 
in the construction of yet another artificial ideal self from this point. Kierkegaard states, 
“If the self in despair is an acting self, it constantly relates itself to itself only by way of 
imaginary constructions, no matter what it undertakes, however vast, however amazing, 
however perseveringly pursued. It recognizes no power over itself; therefore it basically 
lacks earnestness and can conjure forth only an appearance of earnestness” (Sickness; 
Part I, Section C, XI-180.) This individual despairs through an excess of the possibilities 
inherent in the eternal self, forming an ideal self rather than searching for the true self. 
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Alleviation of Despair 
 As one would expect, escaping despair is not simply a matter of consciously 
aligning the self. The first and perhaps most significant act that must occur in the 
acceptance of the self is an acceptance of God. This process of acceptance is termed 
“resting transparently in God.” Much like the process of despairing, the alleviation of 
said despair is a struggle. He states, “Moreover, it is very foolish and simply shows a lack 
of judgment as to what spirit is – along with a failure to appreciate that man is spirit and 
not merely animal – to think that faith and wisdom come easily, that they come as a 
matter of course over the years like teeth, a beard etc. No, whatever a man may arrive at 
as a matter of course, whatever things may come as a matter of course – faith and wisdom 
are definitely not among them” (Sickness; Part I, Section C, XI-170.) The individual 
evolves and develops over the course of his life, but his advancement in faith and piety 
only occurs through conscious effort. 
 Kierkegaard provides an explanation for the phrase resting transparently in God, 
“What is decisive is that with God everything is possible. This is eternally true and 
consequently true at every moment. This is a generally recognized truth, which is 
commonly expressed in this way, but the critical decision does not come until a person is 
brought to his extremity, when, humanly speaking, there is no possibility. Then the 
question is whether he will believe that for God everything is possible, whether he will 
believe” (Sickness; Part 1, Section B, XI-151.) Kierkegaard believes that the individual 
must acknowledge and understand his weakness in order to alleviate his despair. It is only 
when the individual is free from the self-important temporal world and various 
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incarnations of the provisional self that he is open to the abstract possibility and freedom 
of God. The self must necessarily find itself within these abstract possibilities. In despair, 
the possibility must always reflect the acceptance of God, which will protect the 
actuality, even if it is without hope. Insofar as this is true, faith must be accompanied by 
understanding. The virtue of understanding despair and the state of the individual has 
been stated several times in stressing the importance of knowing the balance of self and 
the dangers of ignorance. 
 From a contemporary standpoint, despair still remains an important subject for 
discussion. Not only is Kierkegaard’s treatise about society’s negative effects on the 
natural freedom of each and every individual, he also reveals the strife and psychological 
torment that occurs when the individual turns inward in a search for the truth. 
Additionally, this also gives the reader an understanding of Kierkegaard’s belief in the 
natural religiosity of men. For these reasons, we now turn our focus to society as told 
through Two Ages. In doing so, we will move to a more broad analysis of society while 
keeping the overall picture of the individual constructed through Kierkegaard’s analysis 
of despair in mind.  
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Chapter 3: The Two Ages 
  
This chapter will begin an investigation of society through Kierkegaard’s Two 
Ages. Many of his theories that emerge regarding society are still staggeringly relevant 
today. Two Ages was originally published under the title A Literary Review and indeed 
reviewed Thomasine Gyllembourg’s Two Ages. Kierkegaard’s Two Ages was originally 
published during a period of his life when he was considering abandoning writing. In the 
historical introduction, translator Howard Hong, states, “In a journal entry dated February 
7th, 1846, just before the publication of Concluding Unscientific Postscript and Two Ages, 
he reiterated his intentions to become a pastor. But writing was in his blood and bone, 
and he artfully formulated a way out of his self-imposed stricture: he would write 
reviews. This, in fact, was what he was doing with Thomasine Gyllembourg’s Two Ages 
– continuing his writing without being an author” (Two Ages; introduction, x.) His 
criticisms of the present age, specifically with regards to the public and the press, tell of 
an angry author who cannot understand the rampant secularism of modern society. It is 
no surprise that Kierkegaard debated taking a position outside of Copenhagen at a rural 
pastorate. 
 An “age” refers to an aggregation of time based upon dominant ideologies. The 
quantity of time contained within these ages is impossible to tell from Kierkegaard’s 
analysis. A thorough dissection of Two Ages reveals two distinct possibilities. On the one 
hand, Kierkegaard’s introduction paints ages as being similar to modern “generations.” In 
this case, the generation he is documenting is his own. On the other hand, the inclusion of 
the dominant ideology seems to speak to trends that are far more wide reaching than 
28 
merely one generation of individuals, akin to “modernity” itself. In this context, an age is 
a statement of intellectual and social development over time that applies beyond the 
boundaries of a single community, but could encompass a nation or a whole region. 
Based upon Kierkegaard’s analysis of both the revolutionary and the present ages, I find 
this latter definition to be a more appropriate understanding of the term. In either case, 
this term is used to mark the transition from one set of dominant ideologies to another 
and the changes that accompany such a transformation. 
Two Ages is a tale of a society in search of security. Security refers back to the 
investigation of man emerging from The Sickness Unto Death. Of specific interest is the 
man of immediacy, or that individual who is exclusively concerned with his earthly 
lifestyle and material possessions. This man, who identifies himself by his possessions, 
the clothes he wears, and the provisional personality he presents to the public despairs by 
willing not to be oneself. To be specific, this man only wishes to rid himself of his eternal 
aspects of the self. In doing so, he moves himself further away from his identity towards 
something that he describes as “safe” or “secure.”  
This security lies at the very heart of what is commonly referred to as “existential 
anxiety.” The nature of this anxiety lies in a question. Simply put, how does the 
individual cope with the knowledge of his inevitable death? While the fear of death never 
expressly emerges in the two works studied, a careful reader will find many of 
Kierkegaard’s statements of despair attributable to meditations on life and death. On one 
hand, Kierkegaard stresses the importance of adhering to Christianity and finding one’s 
true identity, which is his eternal soul that finds death as a passing into life. On the other 
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hand, modern individuals are born into a society rich with secular lifestyles, possessions, 
careers, and objectives that serve to alienate the individual from the possibility of death 
and, at the same time, themselves. This alienation, which is despair, remains 
subconscious for the most part, leaving him free to pursue his earthly life. The present 
age is arranged in such a way that individuals are offered very tangible goals based upon 
quantitative means that allows them to feel secure through a secular understanding of 
“making progress” (Sickness; Part I, Section B, XI-140.) Progress then becomes defined 
based upon the desires and lifestyle choices of the individual. He states something very 
similar to this in consideration of the endless cycle of reflection within the individual: 
This is why eventually not even a very gifted person is able 
to liberate himself from reflection, for he soon realizes he is 
merely a fraction in something utterly trivial and misses the 
infinite liberation of the religious life. Even if a small group 
of people had the courage to meet death, we today would 
not say that each individual had the courage to do that, for 
what the individual fears more than death is reflection’s 
judgment upon him, reflection’s objection to his wanting to 
venture something as an individual. The individual does not 
belong to God, to himself, to the beloved, to his art, to his 
scholarship; no, just as a serf belongs to an estate, so the 
individual realizes that in every respect he belongs to an 
abstraction in which reflection subordinates him10. 
The individual, even in light of a supposed freedom of choice, remains bound to his 
trivialities that either prevent such venturing forth towards truth in identity or present this 
undertaking as the essence of futility. The individual is bound not only to his trivialities 
and provisional self, but also to the age itself.
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Theories on Decision and Action 
 Much like the previous chapter examined the motivation behind human behavior, 
this section will begin with an examination of the motivation behind the activity of the 
ages. This will serve as the foundation for most of the contrast between the two ages. 
Kierkegaard argues that there are two dominant social forces that compel an individual to 
act in “passion” and “enthusiasm.” Passion consists of any intangible force out of which 
opinions, or the degree to which an individual favors an object or an idea, are 
constructed. The most common examples of passions are desires and beliefs. 
 The other force that defines the behavior of the ages, enthusiasm, is whatever 
capacity the individual has to translate passion into action. In other words, it is the will, or 
the pure incentive behind acting. An enthusiastic age will constantly be in motion. 
Kierkegaard’s theories of passion and enthusiasm build a rudimentary foundation for 
differences of ages or nations based upon several factors such as political regime, 
religious observance, state of technological progress, general education rates, or relative 
wealth of nations11. The present age lacks both passion and enthusiasm. Instead 
enthusiasm has been replaced by envy, which compels the individual to act not based 
upon any inherent impetus to act, but rather out of a jealousy of the progress or 
possessions of another individual. This follows from the rampant drive for possessions 
and material goods. In this age defined by a fierce individualism, all social relations 
become a form of competition in which individuals strive after more extravagant 
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trivialities. Envy is the basis of the process of “leveling,” which will be examined in the 
context of the press and the public.  
 Kierkegaard’s study of the motivation behind the actions of the age reminds the 
reader of the significance of freedom. This is one of the main links between Two Ages 
and The Sickness Unto Death. In both works, the individual is given freedom and must 
choose his own correct way to live. The individual despairs due to excess social 
possibilities and becomes paralyzed. In another sense, this individual despairs due to lack 
of divine possibilities, which results in his focus on secular trivialities. In order for the 
individual to move forward with his development as both a person and a member of 
society, he must necessarily gain knowledge of that paralysis and remind himself of his 
most basic necessities. 
 
The Revolutionary Age 
 The first age spoken of by Kierkegaard is the Revolutionary Age. It is described 
as an essentially passionate age. Kierkegaard portrays it as nothing short of “romantic.” 
Battles are waged, riots ensue, and individuals give their lives for their beliefs. Erotic 
love is also a staple of this age. The nature of this age is rooted in the spirit of the French 
Revolution, “Having lived through one age, the age that felt the world-wide impact of 
Rousseau’s thought and of the French Revolution, and into the age of rationalism, 
Thomasine Gyllembourg could depict the advantages and disadvantages of both” (Two 
Ages; introduction, ix.) While Gyllembourg actually lived through the event itself, 
Kierkegaard writes from a time and place where the immediate effects of the French 
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Revolution are still being felt throughout much of Europe and finds this present age to be 
a stark contrast to its spirited clashes and social upheavals. 
In spite of the romantic nature of the age of revolution, it is described using terms 
such as “form” and “culture,” which indicate the relative “strength” of the age. 
Kierkegaard states, “The age of revolution is essentially passionate and therefore 
essentially has culture. In other words, the tension and resilience of the inner being are 
the measure of essential culture. A maidservant genuinely in love is essentially cultured; 
a peasant with his mind passionately and powerfully made up is essentially cultured” 
(Two Ages, Part III, Section 1, VIII-58.) In both the given examples, there exists a strong 
passion and enthusiasm in the face of substantial obstacles. Kierkegaard has carefully 
planned his choice of examples based upon his understanding of culture as a balance 
between resilience and tension. The maidservant loves despite holding a position in 
society that sequesters and alienates her from her partner. Similarly the peasant, the most 
common and unimportant of individuals, holds the most powerful opinion and pursues it 
passionately. The perseverance of these individuals displays an inherent dissatisfaction 
with traditional social roles manifested through the emergence of passionate emotions. 
This pattern is the culture of the age of revolution. 
 Passion has a direct correlation with the concept of “concretion.” Kierkegaard 
states, “When individuals (each one individually) are essentially and passionately related 
to an idea and together are essentially related to the same idea, the relation is optimal and 
normative. Individually the relation separates them (each one has himself for himself), 
and ideally it unites them” (Two Ages; Part III, Section 1, VIII-59.) This passionate spirit 
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creates ideals that serve as platforms on which individuals associate in “parties” and 
factions. The above passage stresses the dual nature of these associations. Concretions do 
not attempt to strip the individual of his identity and institute another but strengthen and 
encourage association through commonality. In this sense, passion regarding a certain 
ideology or cause is essentially the foundation for concretion. However, the present age’s 
lacking of passion has made association and concretion impossible. Instead concretion 
has been replaced by a form of individuality that lacks many forms of traditional 
interpersonal interaction found in the age of revolution. 
 Kierkegaard’s analysis of the age of revolution draws to a close with little more 
than the foundation for a comparative study of the two ages. While there is little 
discussion of political arrangements of the revolutionary age, there is sufficient evidence 
that it culminated in wholesale changes that increased the power of the individual and the 
masses relative to the state. A reading of Two Ages leaves one feeling that the 
“revolution” noted in the title is more than just an allusion to the French Revolution. It 
appears to be an age where individuals fought for their freedom, casting aside the 
structure-laden sociopolitical environment of previous ages in favor of the romantic 
pursuit of intangibles such as happiness, security, and love. Kierkegaard describes this, 
“The immediacy [of reaction] of the age of revolution is a restoring of natural 
relationships in contrast to a fossilized formalism which, by having lost the originality of 
the ethical, has become a desiccated ruin, a narrow-hearted custom and practice” (Two 
Ages; Part III, Section 1, VIII-61.) What is described in this passage is an age prior to the 
revolutionary age. While not providing a more detailed characterization of this age, 
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Kierkegaard believes this age retained its rituals, organization, and beliefs despite them 
having become a “desiccated ruin” of former passions and ideologies. The transition 
would have been a spirited and emotional outpouring of actions that, if it could be 
criticized for anything, would be its immediacy of reaction.  
 
The Present Age 
 Whereas the age of revolution represented an age that was, if anything, all too 
willing to act, the present age stands in stark opposition as being utterly devoid of 
passion. Kierkegaard’s disdain for the character of this age is plain to see, not only in the 
body of his criticisms, but also in the changing of his rhetoric and the usage of more 
caustic language. His romantic portrait of the age of revolution gives way to an age of 
stagnation. He states, “The age of great and good actions is past; the present age is the 
age of anticipation” (Two Ages; Part III, Section 2, VIII-67.) The character of the present 
age is not acting, but rather anticipating the wars, riots, and passionate flares which were 
characteristic of the revolutionary age. What caused the transition between the two ages? 
Was this transition indicative of a universal condemning of violence in favor of peace? 
This is partially true. This transition was the result of a fear of wars and violence by those 
individuals who lived during the age of revolution and fought for their freedoms. 
Additionally, the despair that results from a meditation on death and other existential 
dilemmas and the political and social tendencies towards freedom that ushered in the age 
of revolution both contributed towards this movement towards the present age. The 
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present age then stands as a “stagnation” of freedom and equality amongst men that 
results in universal baseness. 
Kierkegaard draws this contrast succinctly between the present and revolutionary 
ages, “An insurrection in this day and age is utterly unimaginable; such a manifestation 
of power would seem ridiculous to the calculating sensibleness of the age” (Two Ages; 
Part III, Section 2, VIII-66.) Calculating sensibleness is an accurate portrait of the 
intensity of the age. Further on, he very effectively characterizes the present age: 
As an age without passion it has no assets of feeling in the 
erotic, no assets of enthusiasm and inwardness in politics 
and religion, no assets of domesticity, piety, and 
appreciation in daily life and social life. But existence 
mocks the wittiness that possesses no assets, even though 
the populace laughs shrilly. To aspire to wittiness without 
possessing the wealth of inwardness is like wanting to be 
prodigal on luxuries and to dispense with the necessities of 
life; as the proverb puts it, it is selling one’s trousers and 
buying a wig. But an age without passion possesses no 
assets; everything becomes, as it were, transactions in 
paper money. Certain phrases and observations circulate 
among the people, partly true and sensible, yet devoid of 
vitality, but there is no hero, no lover, no thinker, no knight 
of faith, no great humanitarian, no person in despair to 
vouch for their validity by having primitively experienced 
them12. 
When considered alongside the concept of despair as developed in the previous chapter, it 
is precisely this absence of despair mentioned which is despair itself. In other words, 
society has been arranged by those secular masses that wish to rid themselves of the 
eternal aspects of self and pursue exclusively earthly endeavors. For this reason, society 
has been entirely reconstituted to accentuate the earthly aspects of life similar to the 
individual that despairs willing not to be oneself. 
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 In the previous chapter, reflection was thought to be an infinite benefit. It was one 
of the main tools used by the individual moving towards the alleviation of despair. 
However, this account of reflection leaves one with an entirely different impression. It is 
stated: 
Reflection’s envy holds the will and energy in a kind of 
captivity. The individual must first of all break out of the 
prison in which his own reflection holds him, and if he 
succeeds, he still does not stand in the open but in the vast 
penitentiary built by the reflection of his associates, and to 
this he is again related through the reflection-relation in 
himself, and this can be broken only by religious 
inwardness. But the fact that reflection is holding the 
individual and the age in a prison, the fact that it is 
reflection that does it and not tyrants and secret police, not 
the clergy and the aristocracy – reflection does everything 
in its power to thwart this discernment and maintains the 
flattering notion that the possibilities which reflection 
offers are much more magnificent than a paltry decision13. 
Kierkegaard makes it very clear that this is not the work of some oppressive social 
institution. Rather, this is a work of individual psychology magnified and applied to 
society writ large. It is a feedback loop created and perpetuated by both the individual 
engaged in reflection and the individuals around him. If the individual would be allowed 
to think about the ideologies and practices of the present age, he would realize how 
superficial and harmful they are, turning away immediately (Two Ages; Part III, Section 
2, VIII-91.) This is precisely the power of the age. The endless reflections over 
possibilities deflect any criticism or blame that would attack the core of the age itself. 
The concept of communication and interpersonal interactions also become 
integral to a study of the present age. Communication is based on two opposing states: 
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silence and speaking. Silence is the place where ideas are synthesized appropriately 
referred to as “ideality.” Kierkegaard states, “For ideality is the equilibrium of opposites. 
For example, someone who has been motivated to creativity by unhappiness, if he is 
genuinely devoted to ideality, will be equally inclined to write about happiness and about 
unhappiness. But silence, the brackets he puts around his own personality, is precisely the 
condition for gaining ideality…” (Two Ages; Part III, Section 2, VIII-92.) On the other 
hand, speaking is the state by which an individual gives voice to the products of his 
reflection14 or ideality. As opposed to the other aspects of the self that are constantly 
engaged in a zero-sum struggle for dominance, the dynamic between speaking and 
silence is more of a process. As seen in the pages of Two Ages, the present age and 
secular society have modified this to include a third middling state entitled “chatter.” 
Chatter acts much like a “language” of the present age. This has two primary 
consequences: first, it ensures that reflection has yet another negative relation within the 
individual and second, it effectively breaks the line between the “private” and the 
“public.” The thoughts and reflections of an individual are his private possessions. The 
public mandates an active dialogue of trivialities that effectively halts the process of 
reflection and stifles the individual’s ability to contemplate. This chattering is akin to the 
modern “gossip” (Two Ages; Part III, Section 2, VIII-88), where nothing is above public 
scrutiny. Communication, therefore, has become another outlet for the power of the age 
through intervening in the meaningful thought process of individuals. Kierkegaard 
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believes this is another mechanism inherent to the present age that further taints the 
reflection of the individual.  
From here, one might ask the question, in this age devoid of passion where 
reflection paralyzes and imprisons the individual, why and how do individuals act? 
Kierkegaard states, “Principle, as the word indicates, is primary, that is, the substance, the 
idea in the unopened form of feeling and inspiration, and impels the individual by its 
inner drive. The person without passion lacks this; for him the principle becomes 
something external for which he is willing to do this or that or the opposite. The life of 
the person devoid of passion is not a self-manifesting and unfolding principle; on the 
contrary, his inner life is a hasty something continually on the move hunting for 
something to do ‘on principle’ (Two Ages; Part III, Section 2, VIII-94.) Kierkegaard here 
provides evidence that human action in the present age is the product of little more than 
boredom. Human nature, as argued by Kierkegaard, requires a degree of variation (Two 
Ages; Part III, Section 2, VIII-77). In a society devoid of passion, the individual seeks 
something to do purely for the sake of action.  
Additionally, action and activity on an individual level have been transformed 
into things that appear “theatrical” (Two Ages; Part III, Section 2, VIII-69) Based on the 
“prison” of reflection constructed and maintained by the reflection of the individual and 
his peers, Kierkegaard conceptualizes the age as transforming all individuals into critics 
and spectators whenever an individual takes even the slightest action. This results from 
the growth of “the public” and the concurrent loss of concretion within society. In other 
words, the individuality and lack of passion have eroded formal and meaningful 
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association and left this “spectator” mentality in its place. Kierkegaard summarizes this 
age as one of “banquets.” The individual ventures forth in action and, if successful, is 
toasted and applauded. However, contrary to the revolutionary age, this celebration is 
largely superficial. Kierkegaard states, “In short, instead of being stimulated to being 
discriminating and encouraged to do the good by this festival of admiration, the 
celebrators would rather go home more disposed than ever to the most dangerous but also 
the most aristocratic of all diseases, to admire socially what one personally regards as 
trivial, because the whole thing has become a theatrical joke, and the spirited toasts of 
admiration had become the secret understanding that they could almost just as well be 
admiring themselves” (Two Ages; Part III, Section 2, VIII-69.) The present age, despite 
offering the individual more freedom and knowledge than any previous age, essentially 
stifles the development of the individual. 
In this age marked by inaction, apathy, boredom, and other factors described by 
Kierkegaard as “aristocratic diseases,” what has become of religion? His criticisms 
remain rooted in the transformations of the revolutionary age towards freedom, 
individualism, and contempt for authority. Instead of maintaining its traditional beliefs 
and rituals, Christianity modified its doctrines to incorporate changes in culture and 
customs. He describes the case of religion to be much like politics, “We do not want to 
abolish the monarchy, by no means, but if little by little we could get it transformed into 
make-believe, we would gladly shout ‘Hurrah for the King!’ We do not want to topple 
eminence, by no means, but if simultaneously we could spread the notion that it is all 
make-believe, we could approve and admire. In the same way we are willing to keep 
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Christian terminology but privately know that nothing decisive is supposed to be meant 
by it” (Two Ages; Part III, Section 2, VIII-76.) The power of the public undermines both 
religion and politics by maintaining traditional rituals and structures while discarding 
passion, faith, and/or enthusiasm. Individuals would rather choose to ignore the will of 
the state or of God that would tax their freedoms than to suggest or take part in the 
construction of a new government. The present age now appears much like the age that 
preceded the age of revolution in which traditions and rituals were “dessicated ruins” of 
what they formerly stood for. This has been the foundation for a destructive “parrot 
morality” in which individuals are reassured of their salvation by the hollow repetition of 
religious passages thus annihilating any incentive for the individual to have spirituality 
(Sickness; Part I, Section C, XI-154.)  
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Chapter 4: Social Institutions – The Press, Public and the State 
  
This chapter will present a more detailed examination of the present age through 
an investigation of three important social institutions: the press, the public, and the state. 
At the time of Kierkegaard’s writing in the mid 19th Century, Copenhagen was only 
narrowly removed from the French Revolution. This violent uproar against tyranny and 
the “fossilized formalism” of Medieval Europe was felt throughout most European 
nations, including Kierkegaard’s home country of Denmark. The masses finally realized 
their strength in a world where thinkers tore down ideological barriers such as the Divine 
Right of Kings. Further, this period found prominent French thinker Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau authoring a series of influential discourses informing men that neither political 
regime nor property could alienate the individual from his natural freedom and liberty15. 
Kierkegaard similarly acknowledges the freedom of individuals before God. However, he 
believes that individuals frequently misuse this freedom through the construction of a 
secular society that only serves to mask a natural despair that all men must reconcile. The 
press, the public, and the state are three institutions of particular importance in fueling the 
masking process of the present age. These three institutions are related through their 
involvement with a process Kierkegaard entitles “leveling.” 
Leveling is a process resulting from a freedom of the press coupled with a strong 
“public.” Leveling is a process of equivocation indicative of modern society’s disregard 
for previous ages manifested through the envy that replaced the enthusiasm of previous 
ages. It is primarily found within the pages of the press. Within the literary world, this 
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process is one of revaluation where all published material is thought to have equal value. 
Kierkegaard states, “If an insurrection at its peak is so like a volcanic explosion that a 
person cannot hear himself speak, leveling at its peak is like a deathly stillness in which 
nothing can rise up but everything sinks down into it, impotent” (Two Ages; Part III, 
Section 2, VIII-79.) Plato16, for example, is considered to be on same level as the writings 
of present age tabloid magazines. Leveling also occurs socially through the 
homogenization of social classes into the public. Outside of the public, there are no other 
classes or associations, only individuals. 
 Like reflection, leveling is an essentially neutral process that may be used either 
positively or negatively. In fact, it is described as something positive in the religious 
sense, “That is the basest kind of leveling, because it always corresponds to the 
denominator in relation to which all are made equal. Thus eternal life is also a kind of 
leveling, and yet it is not so, for the denominator is this: to be an essentially human 
person in the religious sense” (Two Ages; Part III, Section 2, VIII 89.) Being “essentially 
human” refers to the true self that emphasizes each individual’s place before God. 
 
The Press 
 Kierkegaard’s unofficial involvement with the press began with King Frederick 
VI’s decree of press censorship enacted in 1799. Many years later, members of the 
Danish intellectual community began to speak out against this policy as a serious obstacle 
to social development. In 1835, Johannes Ostermann authored an article on the subject 
published in the Danish press entitled “Our Latest Journalistic Literature.” Ostermann’s 
                                                 
16
 Kierkegaard holds Plato and Socrates in high esteem. Despair is a concept based upon Socrates notion of 
the eternal soul. Evidence of this at Sickness; Part I, Section A, XI-134. 
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article advocated “tabloid” journalism due to its ability to give a voice to the lower 
classes (Garff 61.) Kierkegaard crafted a careful response to Ostermann’s article, 
attempting to draw the attention of prominent social figures. Joakim Garff states, 
“Kierkegaard’s contribution to the debate about freedom of the press was in fact a 
grandiose exercise in stirring up a tempest in a teapot” (Garff 62.) His response was read 
in front of an audience that included Ostermann and defended the state’s action as 
necessary in preventing the liberal party from encroaching upon state power. An 
anonymous author responded to Kierkegaard’s article with sufficient wit and literary 
expertise to intimidate Kierkegaard from the pursuing the subject further. Years later, in 
1845, he became involved in a literary fracas known as the “Corsair Affair.” A negative 
review of Kierekgaard’s work appeared in the Danish journal The Corsair, causing 
Kierkegaard to respond with criticism of his own. The editors of The Corsair intervened, 
starting a campaign of literary belittlement targeting Kierkegaard. It is noted that 
Kierkegaard became embittered towards the Danish print media as a direct result of this 
situation, which contributed to his further authorship criticizing the free press (Two Ages; 
Introduction, x.) 
 Kierkegaard believed that the press was purely a vehicle for public criticism and 
slander. In this way, the public utilizes the power of the free press as a way to erode the 
legitimacy of its target. Kierkegaard uses an analogy of an attack dog to effectively state 
the role of the press in relation to the public: 
The dog is the contemptible part of the literary world. If a 
superior person shows up, perhaps even a man of 
distinction, the dog is goaded to attack him, and then the 
fun begins. The nasty dog tears at his coattails, indulges in 
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all sorts of rough tricks, until the public is tired of it and 
says: That is enough now. So the public has done its 
leveling. The superior one, the stronger one, has been 
mistreated – and the dog, well, it remains a dog that even 
the public holds in contempt. In this way the leveling has 
been done by a third party; the public of nothingness has 
leveled through a third party that in and through its 
contemptibleness was already more than leveled and less 
than nothing. And the public is unrepentant, for after all it 
was not the public – in fact, it was the dog, just as one tells 
children: it was the cat that did it. And the public is 
unrepentant, because after all it was not really slander – it 
was a bit of fun. Now if the person instrumental in the 
leveling had been remarkably intelligent, the indolent 
public would have been deceived, for then the instrument 
would have been just another disturbing factor, but if 
superiority is kept down by contemptibleness and 
contemptibleness kept down by itself, then this is the 
quittance of nothingness. And the public will be 
unrepentant, or it actually does not keep the dog, it merely 
subscribes; neither did it directly goad the dog to attack nor 
whistle it back. In the event of a lawsuit, the public would 
say: The dog is not mine; the dog has no owner. And if the 
dog is apprehended and sent to the school of veterinary 
medicine to be exterminated, the public could still say: It 
was really a good thing that the bad dog was exterminated; 
we all wanted it done – even the subscribers. 
Much like the nature of the public itself, the relation between the press and the public is 
purely artificial. The public acknowledges these publications primarily as a voice for 
lower classes or a vehicle for unfounded slander, yet turns to them in a bored search for 
entertainment. Ultimately, baseness of the press is a widely accepted fact. Kierkegaard 
portrays all individuals as equally thankful for the demise of the press at the hands of the 
educated few. 
 
45 
The Public 
 The press cannot engage in the process of leveling without the aid of the public. 
Kierkegaard describes the public as an abstraction. Within the public, all individuals 
equally share the power of society on the whole. Even the basest individual is of the most 
importance. In other words, the public is the result of a “cultural” leveling that operates 
by eliminating any delineation between classes. Outside of the public, individuals are 
isolated and each rises or falls based upon his own successes or failures. 
During the examination of Two Ages, the topic of “concretion” came forth. 
Kierkegaard used the term concretion to describe a condition of association between 
individuals based upon mutual passion and/or beliefs. The revolutionary age had a 
significant degree of concretion due to the passionate character of the age. For example, 
Kierkegaard argues that the violent actions and wars that occurred in the revolutionary 
age resulted from parties and coalitions struggling for ideological dominance (Two Ages; 
Part III, Section 2, VIII-84.) Where the age of revolution was seen to seen to have a large 
degree of concretion, the present age is completely devoid of concretion. The lack of 
passion in the present age correlates directly with the absence of concretion. Kierkegaard 
notes this relationship to be the foundation upon which the public is built. He states: 
The public is a concept that simply could not have appeared 
in antiquity, because the people were obliged to come 
forward en masse in corpore in the situation of action, were 
obliged to bear the responsibility for what was done by 
individuals in their midst, while in turn the individual was 
obliged to be present in person as the one specifically 
involved and had to submit to the summary court for 
approval or disapproval. Only when there is no strong 
communal life to give substance to the concretion will the 
press create this abstraction ‘the public,’ made up of 
unsubstantial individuals who are never united or never can 
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be united in the simultaneity of any situation or 
organization and yet are claimed to be a whole. The public 
is a corps, outnumbering all the people together, but this 
corps can never be called up for inspection; indeed, it 
cannot even have so much as a single representative, 
because it in itself is an abstraction. Nevertheless, if the age 
is reflective, devoid of passion, obliterating everything that 
is concrete, the public becomes the entity that is supposed 
to include everything. But once again this situation is the 
very expression of the fact that the single individual is 
assigned to himself 17. 
This understanding of the public is a very modern concept. Individuals have created an 
ever-present abstraction that serves as an artificial means of association. Contrary to the 
age of revolution that would have demanded allegiance to political parties, warring 
factions, or other social organizations, individuals in the present age have chosen to 
disassociate as a result of their freedom.  
 The nature of the public is fluid, containing varying numbers of individuals at any 
given time. Kierkegaard states, “For a few hours of the day he is part of the public, that 
is, during the hours in which he is the specific person he is, he does not belong to the 
public… The category ‘public’ is reflection’s mirage delusively making the individuals 
conceited, since everyone can arrogate himself to this mammoth, compared to which the 
concretions of actuality seem paltry” (Two Ages; Part III, Section 2, VIII-86.) Members 
of the public act “conceited” due to their power. This power is most easily displayed in 
Kierkegaard’s attack dog example where no component of society is protected from the 
destructive reach of the even the basest elements of society.  
 The presence of a public also has negative effects on future generations by 
removing the incentive and importance of labor and social status. Kierkegaard states: 
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In this state of indolent laxity, more and more individuals 
will aspire to be nobodies in order to become the public… 
That sluggish crowd which understands nothing and is 
unwilling to do anything, that gallery-public, now seeks to 
be entertained and indulges in the notion that everything 
anyone does is done so that it may have something to 
gossip about. Sluggishness crosses its legs and sits there 
like a snob, while everyone who is willing to work, the 
king, and the public official and the teacher and the more 
intelligent journalist and the poet and the artist, all stretch 
and strain, so to speak, to drag along that sluggishness 
which snobbishly believes the others are horses18. 
The public has dissolved class distinctions and subsequently the motivation for 
individuals to pursue excellence in their lives. Instead, Kierkegaard believes the public 
has caused a wholesale regression to the lowest common denominator. The “men of 
excellence” and those ambitious members of society are condemned to shoulder the 
burdens of society without the help of the masses of the public. 
 The effect of the public also spread to the ethical realm. More specifically, the 
individual is weakened from the abstraction of association. He states:  
In our age the principle of association (which at best can 
have validity with respect to material interest) is not 
affirmative but negative; it is an evasion, a dissipation, an 
illusion, whose dialectic is as follows: as it strengthens 
individuals, it vitiates them; it strengthens by numbers, by 
sticking together, but from the ethical point of view this is a 
weakening. Not until the single individual has established 
an ethical stance despite the whole world, not until then can 
there be any question of genuinely uniting; otherwise it gets 
to be a union of people who separately are weak, a union as 
unbeautiful and depraved as a child-marriage19 
Society has been reconstituted upon the foundation of leveling and “public opinion,” 
taking the accumulation of individuals as a symbol of “strength.” However, this 
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discourages the individual from forming his own ethical stance. If the individual was to 
gain valid a ethical opinion, it would create the means of concretion the present age is 
severely lacking. 
 Kierkegaard ultimately finds the public to be a very ironic entity. He views the 
artificial association of so many individuals as the ultimate exercise in absurdity. He 
explains, “And, the ultimate difference between the modern era and antiquity will be that 
the aggregate is not the concretion that reinforces and educates the individual, yet without 
shaping him entirely, but is an abstraction that by means of its alienating, abstract 
equality helps him to become wholly educated – if he does not perish” (Two Ages; Part 
III, Section 2, VIII-86.) In this passage the present age is painted as an all-or-nothing 
crisis where one must accept the alienating abstraction of the public or cast it aside 
permanently. In this sense, the public is the pinnacle of secular society. It is an entity that 
is so ethically destitute and base that it permanently divorces the individual from the 
possibility of finding his true self. This baseness, perceived by an individual venturing 
towards the true self, may deter regressions in development back to levels of pure 
immediacy. 
 
The State  
As expected from the above discussion concerning the public, this abstract entity 
appropriated much of the power traditionally held by the state. Kierkegaard supports this 
assertion by citing the changing of trends from times of antiquity towards a future where 
more democratic political systems reign. He states, “Formerly the ruler, the man of 
excellence, the men of prominence each had his own view; the others were so settled and 
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unquestioning that they did not dare or could not have an opinion. Now everyone can 
have an opinion, but there must be a lumping together numerically in order to have it. 
Twenty-five signatures to the silliest notion is an opinion” (Two Ages; Part III, Section 2, 
VIII-99.) Each individual may give an opinion to the public for support. Strengthening an 
opinion requires a greater quantity of individual advocates. If an opinion garners enough 
followers, it can achieve a status of “public opinion.” A few sentences later, Kierkegaard 
criticizes this concept of “public opinion” as no more credible or valuable than the 
abstraction that defines the public itself. Public opinion represents one of the measures of 
the public designed to appropriate political power away from the state. 
The public’s power relative to the state is further referenced by the above attack 
dog example where no entity, not even one as powerful as the body politic of a society, is 
secure from the random harassment of the public via the press. This serves as one 
possible motive for the retraction of the state. Kierkegaard’s portrayal of politics centers 
on the “disappearance” of “men of excellence.” He states: 
Whereas in older structures (relations between the 
individual and generation) the non-commissioned officers, 
company commanders, generals, the hero (that is, the men 
of excellence, the men prominent in their various ranks, the 
leaders) were recognizable, and each one (according to his 
authority) along with his little detachment was artistically 
and organically ordered within the whole, himself 
supported by and supporting the whole – now the men of 
excellence, the leaders (each according to his respective 
rank) will be without authority precisely because they will 
have divinely understood the diabolical principle of the 
leveling process. Like plainclothes policemen, they will be 
unrecognizable, concealing their respective distinctions and 
giving support only negatively – that is, by repulsion, while 
an infinite uniformity of abstraction judges every 
individual, examines him in isolation. 
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Men of excellence is a term used by Kierkegaard not only to speak to those in positions 
of political leadership, but also those individuals who have suffered through despairing 
and have gained knowledge of their identity. Their “disappearance” is indicative of two 
sides of the same point. It is both an ideological statement about the increasing political 
power of the public and their reluctance to occupy previous monarchic roles steeped in 
impiety. 
This marks a link between despair and leadership that will be examined in greater 
detail. He states, “And not one of the unrecognizable ones will dare give direct help, 
speak plainly, teach openly, assume decisive leadership of the crowd (instead of giving 
negative support and helping the individual to the same decisiveness he himself has). For 
that he would be dismissed because he would be dabbling in human sympathy’s myopic 
ingenuity instead of obeying divine orders, the orders of the angry divinity yet so full of 
grace” (Two Ages; Part III, Section 2, VIII-101.) Kierkegaard here departs the realm of 
functional criticism to advocate his alternative to the present age. Those men of 
excellence disappear from view to avoid a seemingly inevitable state of impiety. 
Understanding these individuals becomes crucial to Kierkegaard’s treatment of how the 
age may undergo changes beneficial to all mankind: 
Only through a suffering act will the unrecognizable one 
dare contribute to leveling and by the same suffering act 
will pass judgment on the instrument. He does not dare to 
defeat leveling outright – he would be dismissed for that, 
since it would be acting with authority – but in suffering he 
will defeat it and thereby experience in turn the law of his 
existence, which is not to rule, to guide, to lead, but in 
suffering to serve, to help indirectly. Those who have not 
made the leap will interpret the suffering act of the 
unrecognizable ones as his defeat, and those who have 
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made the leap will have a vague idea that it was his victory. 
But they will not be certain, because certainty could only 
come from him, and if he provides one single man with that 
directly, it means he is dismissed, for he would be 
unfaithful to God and would be assuming authority, 
because he would not in obeying God learn to love men 
infinitely by constraining himself rather than faithlessly 
constraining them by dominating them, even if they asked 
for it20. 
Kierkegaard characterizes those individuals who have consciously rejected the allure of 
secular life in favor of God and the true self as having made “the leap21.” This leap is the 
decision to believe and have faith regardless of the consequences. He concludes by 
dismissing his preceding statements as banter22. This could be interpreted as “banter” for 
readers that do not have any understanding of despair. In his ideal world, these 
individuals spark something of a silent revolution where individuals will understand and 
follow the example of the men of excellence as the correct way to live. The term indirect 
help then refers to leadership by example rather than formal rule. Kierkegaard states that 
such a society represents the sole means to defeat the power of the public and leveling 
and provide the individual with a head start along the path towards the alleviation of their 
despair. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Analysis 
 
 This final chapter allows me to reflect on the issues brought forth from 
Kierkegaard’s two works. The first section will be devoted to summarizing and 
concluding discussions in the previous chapters. The second section will allow me to 
analyze and evaluate Kierkegaard’s assertions in terms of their soundness and their 
relevance to modern society. Despite Kierkegaard’s belief that his criticisms of the 
present age would not be relevant, his claims still accurately portray the state of modern 
societies. Not only does Kierkegaard accurately characterize the crisis of faith in the 
modern world in his discussion of despair, but he also witnesses a society gradually 
losing concretion and a sense of collective identity. Additionally, his meditations on the 
freedom of the press speak to the complexity of the issue and reflect modern 
sociopolitical developments in information dispersal. Ultimately, modern readers of 
Kierkegaard will find his documentation of the birth of the modern era to be both 
surprisingly accurate and predictive of the evolution of modern societies.   
 What are the ways in which the present age exacerbates despair? The first and 
most significant way is through the arrangement of society around material goods and 
earthly concerns. When God releases the individual into the world of freedom, the 
individual follows a natural and inherent need towards “becoming.” Societal tendencies 
towards secularity results in the creation of an artificial self that masks the divinely 
created true self. Instead of a society in which individuals pursue important matters such 
as knowledge of this true self, the present age is lost in the abyss of material goods and 
secularism. The one entity that can enlighten the individual, the Christian church, has 
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retreated from preaching the truth in favor of a derivative that appeals to the masses and 
takes little effort according to Kierkegaard. His works speak of a disappointment not only 
with humanity’s choice of a path, but also in Christianity for its complacency with and 
complicity in the development of such a society. 
Secondly, in addition to masking the true self, the emphasis on secularity also 
displaces the balance of the individual in favor of the limiting aspects of the self. This is 
reflected in Kierkegaard’s belief that individuals in the present age rarely advance past a 
certain stage in their self-understanding. As such, the present age is portrayed as an age 
that has come to a standstill. The enthusiasm of previous ages towards something 
“higher” has been replaced by the base and tendencies towards envy inherent in leveling. 
Instead of factions fighting common enemies or individuals striving to seek the truth of 
the true self, individuals only struggle with one another over material possessions. 
Kierkegaard adds the disappearance of ethics to this diminishing incentive to act. His 
description of modern society appears as an incredibly elaborate and ornate arena in 
which combat occurs between beasts23. To the victor go the most trivial goods and most 
superficial understanding of his existence. 
Finally, despite his assertion of the universality of despair, Kierkegaard believes 
that individuals do occasionally resist the allure of secular society and seek the true self. 
The closer the individual comes to the true self, the more intense their despair becomes. 
The individual feels the sorrow and pain of the concealed self and becomes oneself 
through what Kierkegaard entitles a “suffering act.” These individuals are very few. 
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Kierkegaard believes that once men become attuned to their true self, they disappear from 
modern society. This is based upon their recognition of the incompatibility between 
themselves and society and their wish to live as an example to provide others with the 
empowerment necessary to resist the pull of the present age. Modern society is viewed as 
impious to these men who may live among members of the public while ideologically 
differentiating themselves according to an awareness of the true self. 
Kierkegaard leaves the reader with a series of suggestions for the improvement of 
society. First, the individual should not accept societal truths without first questioning 
their validity through reflection. The individual must trust his reflection, and look beyond 
the horizons of modern society in his quest “to become.” Secondly, the individual must 
have faith. He must believe, or “rest transparently” in God. This can only be 
accomplished through finding the true self. The inexorable link between God and man is 
known by the true self, which gives the individual who has alleviated his despair a sense 
of security. Finally, Kierkegaard believes solving the problems of the present age 
necessarily begins at the level of the individual. The “men of excellence” who are able to 
alleviate their despair live as examples to the rest of society, which will gradually move 
away from secularity. While not providing a vision of societal arrangement in a world 
without despair, it stands to reason that it will be very different from the movement and 
trends of modern society. 
  
Analysis 
Kierkegaard’s criticisms of the present age are rooted in a few key concepts. First, 
there is an inherent tension between the individual and freedom. Freedom refers both to 
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freedom before God (or “free will”) and societal freedom. Contrary to other influential 
theologians such as St. Augustine, Kierkegaard finds freedom before God to be a 
necessary condition of man. One seeking God’s plan must look to the actual self rather 
than awaiting his inevitable fate. Individuals have the possibility of experiencing despair 
from the moment they leave God’s hand. However, despair occurs when the society an 
individual is born into provides neither information nor incentive to find the true self. 
Despair then may be somewhat of a “divine test” to prove an individual’s devotion to 
himself and to God. The individual that reaches the end of his life in despair is bound to 
his despairing self and must suffer in sorrow for eternity. This enigmatic statement refers 
to the Christian concept of passing into life. When the human self dies, the eternal self 
awakens. If this eternal self remained concealed under layers of secular trivialities, it is 
condemned to remain this way forever. 
As stated in my third chapter, Two Ages analyzes the individual’s search for 
security in an uncertain world. The inevitable death of human beings is the foundation of 
this insecurity. The drive towards secularity represents a search for this security. 
Kierkegaard believes this is both counterintuitive and “wretched,” representing 
movement in polar opposition to finding the true self. Instead of venturing to learn the 
truth of the individual made in the image of God, humanity has attempted to create 
society in its own image, conferring direction and meaning to the lives of its members. 
These individuals lack the possibility put forth from their eternal self and its link to the 
infinite possibilities in God. Necessity binds these individuals to a search to find value in 
their lives, yet without possibility they are unable to see the truth. Instead, individuals 
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keep constructing and maintaining the secular machine “on principle.” They are not 
encouraged to struggle or suffer for something higher – the priests assure them of 
salvation, their leaders have disappeared from view to avoid the scorn of the public, and 
their peers appear to be following the same path. Kierkegaard describes this lacking of 
proper incentive as the loss of “enthusiasm” in Two Ages. The individual despairs of his 
provisional self yet cannot see the incentive of the true self beyond the allures of secular 
society. On this basis, modernity alienates the individual from his true self long before he 
can choose to pursue it. It is then the responsibility of the individual to seek the truth in 
freedom. 
Similar to the security/insecurity dilemma experienced by the individual, there is 
a noticeable focus on a perceived crisis between certainty and uncertainty. I believe this 
plays out through Kierkegaard’s analysis of the “prison of reflection.” When the present 
age individual reflects, he become intoxicated through excess of secular possibilities. The 
human brain, without the help of divine reflection, is too weak to evaluate and adequately 
process every choice available at any given time. This uncertainty then perpetuates 
inaction. Just when an individual appears as if he may be approaching a decision, 
Kierkegaard warns that this is the point at which he can and usually does collapse back 
into the abyss of alternatives. For this reason, the individual must rest transparently in 
God. God provides him the certainty of the self so that he may venture forth without 
fearing human judgment. Kierkegaard finds this judgment to be another major source of 
human impiety. Judgment and leadership is to be left to God, while the individual must 
devote his life to an investigation of who he is. 
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Despair is articulated as the case for religion in the modern world. The basis of 
proper religious life not is in devoting one’s life to the solitary study of religious tomes, 
but simply in searching for the truth within one’s self. The individual is convinced there 
must be some hint to his existence in the externalities around him, yet finds only the 
temples erected to secular society that yield little meaningful assistance. If the individual 
is given some sort of hint to examine the self, he reaches a state of crisis. Either he must 
examine this lead, which has the possibility of annihilating what he knows to be certain 
about the world, or discard this hint and be lost forever. The individual would rather cling 
to the certainty of what he knows and has experienced rather than brave the uncertainty 
of belief and faith central to understanding God and the self. 
How was Kierkegaard able to gain such acute knowledge of the self? His family 
life was filled with tragedies and sorrow that constantly reminded him of the frailty and 
weakness of human life. Michael Kierkegaard taught his children of the impious 
implications of a life spent desiring trivialities at an early age by outlawing toys in their 
household. Upon gaining formal religious education, Søren was able to look beyond the 
written words of Christian dogma and the snares of secular society and begin the inward 
journey to the true self. He sought “the idea for which I am willing to live and die” in 
addition to the solution to the “riddle of life” (Garff 58, 52) As such, Two Ages is written 
from the perspective of a spectator of the present age rather than a participant. 
The second form of freedom, societal freedom, is one of the most significant 
foundations of the modern world. Kierkegaard’s treatment of the age of revolution speaks 
of the beginnings of this freedom. No longer were the masses able to tolerate the 
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structure-laden political regimes of antiquity that regularly exploited them. This 
culminated in the wars and revolutions that overthrew more than a political regime. This 
age destroyed the previous dominant ideologies and installed their own. For example, the 
masses laid down their lives for freedom during the French Revolution. Individuals had 
finally won a key battle ensuring what Rousseau fashioned as “inalienable rights.” More 
importantly, they were free to organize societies and structure their own lives 
accordingly. Kierkegaard notes that the present age, following in the footsteps of the age 
of revolution, marks the first generation of individuals able to enjoy the products of these 
revolutions without having taken part in the struggle and suffering that defined the age. 
As such, these individuals squandered their freedom without remorse, organizing a 
society based around an apathetic and bored “indolent laxity” inherited from the hard 
earned peace of the previous generation.  
Kierkegaard’s portrayal of individuals and their “indolent laxity” leaves much to 
be desired. Danish society appears much like the popular story of the “Tragedy of the 
Commons” where the men of excellence are left to support the good of society on the 
whole. Present society has undergone significant changes, exhibiting many cases in 
which the bulk of the public labors for the benefit of a few individuals at the top of 
massive corporations. The present individual is a very productive individual who works 
in a very specific position within a highly developed and specialized division of labor. 
Attaining a slot in the modern job market usually requires the individual to seek forms of 
further education in his career field to stand out as a candidate. While lazy and/or 
parasitic individuals will be found in any age and social arrangement, present-day society 
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holds individuals to a high standard with regards to their “work ethic,” or their 
commitment to their careers. Employees in most modern companies are regularly 
screened to ensure maximum efficiency and may be removed from their position based 
upon their performance. 
The second major theme emerging from Kierkegaard’s works is the erosion of 
value that accompanied this new generation of individuals. This is most prevalent in 
Kierkegaard’s treatment of religious life, where he criticizes the “parrot morality” of the 
modern individual. This parrot morality has eroded the very foundation of religious life 
by keeping traditional religious rituals and dogma in place, yet following them “on 
principle” rather than “in faith.” This is still problematic in present-day society, in 
modern incarnations such as the phenomenon know as “Cultural Catholicism.” I suspect 
Kierkegaard would see this as a continuation of the indolent laxity of the age in which he 
lived. 
 This form of parrot morality has also spread to the relationship of the individual 
with the state. The present age inherited the suspicion of authority and fierce 
individualism forged in the passionate conflicts of the age of revolution. These two 
factors sparked the development of the public, the third major theme throughout 
Kierkegaard’s work. The public is an abstraction. It embodies the freedom and power of 
the individuals as a significant political entity. It has appropriated much of the powers of 
state through the creation of “public opinion.” Individuals in Kierkegaard’s time were 
able to democratically decide “popular” issues through tallying of votes or accumulation 
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of opinions. Thus, individuals may declare their allegiance to the state while privately 
acknowledging their superiority over any governing entity. 
 Our present day culture has magnified the power of “public opinion” to the 
extreme through the creation of an “advertising culture.” This culture is a mix of 
capitalism and communication. It also speaks to the growth and evolution of “chatter” 
which Kierkegaard found blurs the lines between conceptions of public and private. The 
individual’s private space has now been almost completely annihilated through 
technological advancements in computers, telephones, television, and radio. All of these 
are either engaged in broadcasting a message or providing the individual with a means to 
associate with others. Modern private life has been confined to the term “home,” which is 
a place that the individual may encounter fewer intrusions from the public. However, the 
home is far from that place Kierkegaard found where individuals are able to synthesize 
thoughts through ideality and inwardness. Institutions and organizations now rely on the 
popular media to advertise their cause or product into every household. Political 
candidates spend impossible amounts of money attempting to penetrate into the “hearts 
and minds” of individuals – the two places that have yet to be commoditized. These 
candidates attempt to address the issues that are of greatest concern to the public such as 
the state of the economy or the environment. Public opinion largely still dictates the 
course of political action. 
At the time in which Kierkegaard wrote, a free press was seen as a means of free 
speech. Johannes Ostermann in his defense of the free press stated the value of the press 
in allowing the lower classes to be heard. In present society, these issues are very 
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separate. The United States Constitution delineates between freedom of the press and 
freedom of speech as two different concepts. The “press” has expanded into the “media” 
which speaks to its exponential growth over time. Individuals may state their message if 
they have sufficient funds to pay for time or space (which has been commoditized) and 
their rhetoric is accepted by the publication. Regulatory bodies exist within present-day 
society, ensuring the messages reaching the public meet a certain standard of 
acceptability and inoffensiveness. Despite this “mass” media existing on the level of “big 
business,” the individual may still publish his views unhindered while garnering a smaller 
audience.  
Finally, much like the present age, which hunts for things to do “on principle” 
from their bored and apathetic standpoint, present-day society exhibits a similar degree of 
disenchantment. This is particularly prevalent in younger generations, who frequently 
combat the routines of normal life by embracing “extreme” behavior, including 
dangerous variations of modern sports and recreational drug use. Much like the man in 
Kierkegaard’s example who does not recognize himself after venturing into town to buy 
new clothes and get drunk, the modern youth relies upon expressive clothing and 
chemical substances to assume new identities that are far removed from his true self. This 
new provisional self does not recognize the actual self, and ignores it resulting in despair. 
Additionally, society on the whole has exhibited signs of a possible correlation between 
the level of social development and psychological problems suffered by the individual. 
Advancements in the medical field have allowed for the creation of “mood-altering” 
substances ranging from those designed to alleviate anxiety within the individual to those 
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designed to make him more comfortable within his own life. At home, individuals seek 
entertainment through the media. Television programs, movies, and music are all 
preferred means for individuals to take self-professed “escapes” from their career-
oriented lives. The actors and actresses that make these forms of entertainment possible 
are rewarded for their services with the opportunity to live an extremely wealthy lifestyle.  
 Despite Kierkegaard’s warnings about the dangers of modern societies, there are a 
few ways in which these changes have been beneficial to present-day individuals. For 
example, leveling has proven beneficial in a number of ways. For example, present-day 
Americans are considered equal under the law, providing weaker members of society 
with a legal safeguard against stronger individuals or entities. This has resulted in a sense 
of individual empowerment that individuals have utilized in order to fight oppression. 
The American Civil Rights Movement, for example, resulted in many changes of 
governmental policy and public opinion that began the country on the road to racial and 
gender based equality. While there is still much progress to be made, these changes 
would not have been possible without some form of cultural leveling.  
Much like the “prison of reflection” and fierce individualism Kierkegaard warned 
of, individuals remain overly conscious of the opinions of others. Despite this, present 
society is regaining some degree of concretion through renewed value on interpersonal 
relationships. This has evolved partially as a result of the modern “comfort zone.” This 
term applies to a group of individuals who are trusted based on relationship with the 
individual or their personal integrity. The criticism of these individuals is usually 
considered constructive and interpreted as a positive contribution to the individual 
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receiving this advice. The advice and criticisms of others are largely unwelcome in the 
modern individual, who takes pride in his individuality and his ability to know the best 
way to live. To this end, many modern organizations encourage the formation of 
communities and friendships to combat the isolative tendencies of individualism. Indeed, 
many present-day friendships originate from a common employment place or situation. 
Additionally, increasing population densities in urban environments has contributed to 
the formation of communities and a form of geographical camaraderie. 
While many of Kierkegaard’s criticisms are the product of extremely thoughtful 
meditations on aspects of the present age, there are two areas where his analysis is 
questionable. One major criticism of Kierkegaard’s writing lies in his treatment of 
despair. Specifically, his account of the individual who has alleviated his despair leaves 
many questions unanswered. Once an individual has accepted the true self, balanced and 
moderated the forces in his life, and rests transparently in God, how is the individual to 
live? Could a scenario occur where the individual once again falls prey to the seduction 
of modernity and relapses into a life of sin? After the individual has become the true 
divinely intended self, does this satisfy his internal need “to become” and if so, what 
happens then? Does the individual who has disappeared from society completely isolate 
oneself or does he still have some interaction with secular society? Kierkegaard never 
addresses these concerns. Instead, his writing appears more interested in diagnosing the 
problem than providing a detailed solution. Perhaps it is the case that Kierkegaard 
believes the true self contains all the information necessary to live out one’s life absent 
despair. If this were the case, it would be consistent with his belief that individuals 
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attempting to tell others the correct way to live are impious. In any case, Kierkegaard’s 
treatment of a state beyond despair is incomplete. Secondly, despite Kierkegaard 
seriously considering a lifetime pursuit of the natural sciences, he does not include them 
in his account of the present age. This is especially confusing considering his statements 
in Two Ages indicating that the current age has access to more knowledge than any 
previous generation. In what ways and concerning what topics are individuals more 
educated? What implication does this have on the whole of society? 
Certain aspects of society have changed since the time in which Kierkegaard 
wrote. However, his criticisms, warnings, and observations still hold a high degree of 
relevance in present-day society. These predictions also provide a contrast between the 
modern age in which we live and the pre-modern age. Kierkegaard has focused on those 
aspects of the modern age that alienate the individual from his true nature as a human 
being. While present-day society continues to essentially lead the individual astray, it has 
made some progress in appropriating those aspects of previous ages that were beneficial 
to all of humankind. As such, Kierkegaard’s analysis remains indispensable to 
understanding where these societies originated and the motives behind their actions. 
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